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Rethinking the Role of Religion in Changing Public 
Spheres: Some Comparative Perspectives 
Rosalind I.J. Hackett.∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until the early 1990s, there was a clear disparity between the 
growing significance of religion on the world stage and the literature 
one could read on this score in either scholarly or popular 
publications. Historian Scott Appleby stated candidly that “Western 
myopia on this subject of religious power has been astounding.”1 
Former ambassador Robert A. Seiple, the first-ever U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, criticizes 
the academic disciplines that address international affairs for giving 
religion “short shrift.”2 For a long time, scholars assumed that 
religions were the carriers of tradition and predicted that they would 
enter into decline because of secularization and privatization.3 The 
recent increase in claims for the recognition and implementation of 
religious ideas, identities, values, practices, and institutions in the 
governance of nation-states and the lives of their citizens, however, 
indicates that these predictions were wrong.4 In the words of Talal 
∗ Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University. My thanks to E. 
Gary Spitko, Douglas R. Cole, June Carbone, Ruth Colker, Ned Foley, David Goldberger, 
Brad Joondeph, Ron Krotoszynski, Marc Spindelman, Stephen J. Ware, and the participants in 
a faculty workshop at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Additional thanks to Kristen Blankely, Sabrina Riggs, 
and Natalie Hostacky for their research assistance.
 1. R. Scott Appleby, Retrieving the Missing Dimension of Statecraft: Religious Faith in 
the Service of Peacebuilding, in FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY: TRUMPING REALPOLITIK 231 
(Douglas Johnston ed., 2003). 
2. Robert A. Seiple, Why Brandywine Review?, BRANDYWINE REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF., 
Spring 2003, at 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel H. Levine, The News About Religion in Latin America, in 
RELIGION ON THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENDA 122 (Mark Silk ed., 2000). 
 4. Migrant populations and religious revivalism are openly challenging the Western 
paradigm of the secular state and privatized, individualized religion in post-colonial states, as 
well as in the United States. See, e.g., Dale F. Eickelman & Jon W. Anderson, Redefining 
Muslim Publics, in NEW MEDIA IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 1 (Dale F. Eickelman & Jon W. 
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Asad, “a straightforward narrative of progress from the religious to 
the secular is no longer acceptable.”5
Spurred by globalization, democratization, and the rise of 
modern media, this remarkable religious resurgence is evident in a 
variety of places—from scholarly work and popular interest to the 
increased awareness of the importance of religion in diplomacy and 
peacebuilding.6 Debates and publications regarding the appropriate 
role of religion in both emergent and longstanding democracies 
increasingly inform political will and public policy. 
However, religious resurgence brings new problems for both 
emergent and established nation-states. This Article contends that 
nation-states can achieve successful governance only through careful 
management of religious and cultural differences and through 
respect for religious minorities and non-conventional religious 
groups in increasingly multi-religious and multicultural national 
contexts.7
Part II of this Article discusses the heightened role of religion, 
and the concomitant recognition of this role, in the public sphere. 
Anderson eds., 1999) (stating that much of the public sphere is “[s]ituated outside formal 
state control”). 
 5. TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 
1 (2003).  
 6. Many would rightly argue that these debates about religion in the public sphere 
cannot be understood in isolation from religion-state relations and constitutional and 
international human rights perspectives; the literature in this area now abounds. See, e.g., JOHN 
ANDERSON, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 
(2003); W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Johan D. van 
der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996); CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (John Merrills ed., 2001); Malcolm D. 
Evans, Religion, Law and Human Rights: Locating the Debate, in LAW AND RELIGION IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Peter W. Edge & Graham Harvey eds., 2000); FACILITATING 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 2004); 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM AND EQUALITY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF (Derek 
H. Davis & Gerhard Beiser eds., 2002); REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM 
AROUND THE GLOBE (James T. Richardson ed., 2004). For additional resources, see Religion 
and Law Research Consortium, http://www.religlaw.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Center 
for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion, http://www.law.emory.edu/cisr/ (last visited Mar. 
22, 2005); J.L. & RELIGION, available at http://www.hamline.edu/law/jlr/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005); Human Rights and Freedom of Religion or Belief Links, 
in UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/links/religion.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  
 7. On the plight of religious minorities in particular, see PROTECTING THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Pete G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. 
Cole eds., 2002). 
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Part III addresses the new prominence of religion in American public 
life and the critical role religious activism is now playing in contested 
social issues. Part IV deals with the tension between secularism and 
religion and offers a glimpse of some of the problems associated with 
religious diversity and competition. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE INCREASED RECOGNITION OF RELIGION IN 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
A. Academic Recognition of Religion in the Public Sphere 
Prior to the early 1990s, literature had been lacking in the area of 
religion in the public sphere, notably at the international level. This 
lack of recognition of religion caused scholars and observers to 
downplay the significance of religion in domestic and global affairs.8 
The early 1990s marked an upsurge in literature recognizing the role 
of religion in the public sphere. 
One of the most influential and controversial of these writings 
was Samuel Huntington’s piece, The Clash of Civilizations?.9 
Huntington argued that the world would be shaped, in large 
measure, by the interactions among seven or eight major 
civilizations, namely, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, 
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African. The article 
provoked criticism by suggesting that the most important 
differentiating feature was religion and that post-Cold War optimism 
would be shattered by dangerous and deep-rooted cultural conflict.10 
Many scholars felt that Huntington oversimplified the mapping of 
 8. For example, scholars and observers missed the religious roots of the civil rights 
movement in the United States and misread the surge of the Iranian revolution. Levine, supra 
note 3, at 122.  
 9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, 
at 22; see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING 
OF WORLD ORDER (1996). See also Huntington’s latest work, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, 
WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004), on the 
erosion of America’s Anglo-Protestant culture by the problems of massive immigration, 
bilingualism, multiculturalism, etc. 
 10. Robert D. Kaplan, Looking the World in the Eye, 80 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 68 Dec. 
2001, at 68. For a critique by eminent scholars of Islam regarding Huntington’s suggestion 
that Islam and the West were on a collision course, see THE NEW CRUSADES: CONSTRUCTING 
THE MUSLIM ENEMY (Emran Qureshi & Michael A. Sells eds., 2003). See also Akeel Bilgrami, 
The Clash Within Civilizations, DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Summer 2003, at 88. 
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the contemporary world by declaring that “[t]he fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”11
Prescient or not, Huntington’s work stimulated a flood of long 
overdue studies on the role of religion in international affairs. It sent 
die-hard secular political scientists and social critics into a tailspin, as 
evidenced by the flurry of publications more attentive to the 
influence of religion in the last decade.12 A landmark study entitled 
Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft13 demonstrates that 
religion has been absent from the analysis of many international 
conflicts and their resolutions. This study advocates the 
reconsideration of religion as an important factor in international 
diplomacy. 
Other published works have also helped focus attention on the 
growing importance of religion on the international scene. One of 
these publications was Jose Casanova’s influential study, Public 
Religions in the Modern World.14 This book reconsiders the 
relationship between religion and modernity and argues that many 
religious traditions have been making their way, sometimes 
forcefully, out of the private sphere and into public life at an 
increasingly transnational level.15 This movement of religion into the 
public sphere, notes Hent de Vries, is also facilitated by the radical 
transformation of “the functions ascribed to modern subjectivity, to 
the political, the economy, the nation, the state, the public sphere, 
[and] privacy.”16
 11. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, supra note 9, at 22. 
 12. See Daniel Philpott, The Challenge of September 11th to Secularism in International 
Relations, WORLD POL., Oct. 2002, at 66, for a discussion of this body of literature. Of 
particular note is Religion and International Relations, 29 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. No. 
3, 2000. See also JONATHAN FOX & SHMUEL SANDLER, BRINGING RELIGION INTO 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2004).  
 13. RELIGION, THE MISSING DIMENSION OF STATECRAFT (Douglas Johnston & 
Cynthia Sampson eds., 1994). 
 14. JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994). 
 15. Additional key works in this area are ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: 
SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE (1992); TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION AND FADING 
STATES (Susanne Hoeber Rudolph & James Piscatori eds., 1997); and Peter Beyer, The 
Modern Emergence of Religions and a Global Social System for Religion, 13 INT’L SOC. 151 
(1998). See also STEPHEN ELLIS & GERRIE TER HAAR, WORLDS OF POWER: RELIGIOUS 
THOUGHT AND POLITICAL PRACTICE IN AFRICA (2004) (arguing that religious and spiritual 
beliefs persist and flourish amidst the vagaries of social and political life).  
 16. HENT DE VRIES, RELIGION AND VIOLENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM 
KANT TO DERRIDA 19 (2001). 
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Moreover, the mass media dimension of these developments has 
been well articulated by sociologist Manuel Castells, who argues that 
we have passed from Giddens’s era of “late modernity” into the age 
of the “network society.”17 The information technology revolution 
and the restructuring of capitalist economies have generated this new 
form of society. In Castells’s opinion, these societal changes have led 
to a disjunction between the local and the global, as well as a 
disjunction between power and experience for most individuals and 
social groups.18 Consequently, he states, “[t]he search for meaning 
takes place . . . in the reconstruction of defensive identities around 
communal principles.”19 These new forms of communal resistance or 
“cultural communes,” as Castells terms them, are at the base of the 
new primacy of identity politics in today’s network society and 
information age.20 He sees the resurgence of religious 
fundamentalism as reflecting the contestations of the new global 
order.21 Given their reactive nature, these movements constitute a 
social barometer aiming to construct “social and personal identity on 
the basis of images of the past and projecting them into a utopian 
future, to overcome unbearable present times.”22
With that background, the September 11th terrorist attacks 
spectacularly demonstrated the effects of religious ideology on the 
public sphere. In the words of Philip Jenkins, a prominent academic 
commentator on contemporary religious affairs, “the twenty-first 
century will almost certainly be regarded by future historians as a 
century in which religion replaced ideology as the prime animating 
and destructive force in human affairs, guiding attitudes to political 
liberty and obligation, concepts of nationhood, and, of course, 
 17. 2 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND 
CULTURE: THE POWER OF IDENTITY 10–11 (1997). 
 18. Id. at 11. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 65–67. 
 21. Peter van der Veer prefers to designate these movements as “religious nationalisms,” 
since many of them “articulate discourse on the religious community with discourse on the 
nation.” Peter van der Veer, The Victim’s Tale: Memory and Forgetting in the Story of Violence, 
in VIOLENCE, IDENTITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 186, 195 (Hent de Vries & Samuel 
Weber eds., 1997). 
 22. CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 25; Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The 
Imperative of Prioritizing for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa, 47 J. AFR. L. 1, 15 
(2003) (tracing the “pathologies of suffering, conflict and systematic violations of human 
rights that Africa has suffered” back to colonial patterns of exclusion and ethnic 
discrimination). See also van der Veer, supra note 21. 
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conflicts and wars.”23 The production of works on Islam, on religion 
and violence generally, and on peace and tolerance has escalated 
exponentially since September 11th. Additionally, September 11th 
brought home to many not only the need to know more about other 
religious interpretations of the world, but also a stronger sense of the 
ambivalence of the sacred24 and our global connectedness. One 
human rights scholar poignantly calls this “our shared 
vulnerability.”25
B. Popular Recognition of Religion in the Public Sphere 
Interestingly, while journalists and academic analysts have rushed 
to catch up with global religious resurgences, books promoting 
religion, more religion, or better religion are bestsellers in many 
parts of the world. Books on religion or spirituality now feature 
regularly on The New York Times bestseller list, ranging from 
religious reflections and spiritual guides to modern interpretations of 
ancient, sacred wisdom.26 One can also find histories and 
contemporary accounts of religious traditions, concepts, and holy 
places written for the general reader, such as A History of God and 
The Battle for God by popular British author Karen Armstrong.27
Once President Bill Clinton started singing the praises of Yale 
law professor Stephen Carter’s works, such as The Culture of 
Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious 
Devotion,28 sales went up exponentially.29 Explaining how preserving 
 23. Philip Jenkins, The Next Christianity, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2002, at 54. 
 24. R. SCOTT APPLEBY, THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE SACRED: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, 
AND RECONCILIATION (1999). The phrase, ambivalence of the sacred, refers to the idea that 
religion can serve as a vehicle for either violence or peace. Id. 
 25. Abdullah A. An-Na’im, Consciousness of Vulnerability, in A HUMAN RIGHTS 
MESSAGE 16 (1998). 
 26. For instance, on the Hardback Non-Fiction list for March 9, 2005, one could find 
Secrets & Mysteries of the World, by Sylvia Browne, a self-proclaimed psychic who tries to 
explain the inexplicable, and God’s Politics, by Jim Wallis an evangelical Christian who argues 
that Democrats must “take back the faith” and not allow conservative Republicans to hijack 
the Bible. At the top of the Hardcover Advice list was Your Best Life Now, by Joel Osteen, who 
advocates a faith-based approach to living with enthusiasm. This was closely followed by The 
Purpose-Driven Life, by Rick Warren, who seeks to find the meaning of life through God. 
 27. KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BATTLE FOR GOD (2000); KAREN ARMSTRONG, A 
HISTORY OF GOD: THE 4000-YEAR QUEST OF JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1993). 
 28. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
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a special role for religious communities can strengthen democracy, 
Carter criticizes contemporary American law and politics for 
marginalizing religious faith such that it cannot be a resource for 
political action.30 In his more recent book, God’s Name in Vain: The 
Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics,31 Carter expresses his 
concerns about the risks and limitations of political involvement for 
religious people and communities. He writes, 
We must never become a nation that propounds an official religion 
or suggests that some religions are more American than others. At 
the same time, one of the official religions we must never propound 
is the religion of secularism, the suggestion that there is something 
un-American about trying to live life in a way that puts God first. 
Quite the contrary: Preserving the ability of the faithful to put God 
first is precisely the purpose for which freedom of religion must 
exist.32
Carter worries about religious voices losing their prophetic edge 
by being co-opted by political forces and about the antireligious 
politics of the political elite. He suggests that without an 
independent religious conscience there might never have been an 
abolitionist movement, a movement for the rights of industrial 
workers, or the civil rights movement.33 In the book, he lays out 
what he considers to be the basis of “principled and prophetic 
religious activism.”34 Incidentally, Carter has been criticized for 
propagating a version of religion which is “self-evidently 
personalistic, moralistic, and experiential, and most definitely of the 
monotheistic variety;” which sustains the misleading dichotomy of 
“church-state;” and which prevents people from seeing how values 
 29. See Franklin Foer, The Stephen Carter Moment: Will the Provocative Yale Law Prof. 
Save Us from Our Culture of Disbelief?, BELIEFNET, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/50/ 
story_5093_1.html (last visited March 22, 2005) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S 
NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000) [hereinafter 
NAME IN VAIN]). 
 30. CARTER, supra note 28. 
 31. NAME IN VAIN, supra note 29.  
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. In a similar vein, THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND THE DEMOCRATISATION OF 
AFRICA (Paul Gifford ed., 1995), critically examines the contribution of the African churches 
in several countries to the processes of democratization. 
 34. CARTER, supra note 28, at 7. 
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may be cultivated in the “secular” realm.35 Another critic describes 
Carter’s book as “a product of the very culture it purports to 
criticize,” saying that it advances a view of religion as legitimate only 
when in service of democracy.36 Even this criticism indicates the 
stakes of the debate about religion’s role in the public sphere. 
C. Diplomatic Recognition of Religion in the Public Sphere 
As an extension of the greater recognition of the role of religion 
on the international stage, a number of new initiatives to extend the 
scope of faith-based organizations to the diplomatic realm are 
notable. A number of recently published works realistically address 
the religious dimension of specific diplomatic efforts such as conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding.37 A new book, Faith-Based 
Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik,38 gives shape to this emerging 
field. The editor, Douglas Johnston, calls for religious imperatives to 
be “incorporated as a major consideration in U.S. foreign policy,”39 
and for greater consideration to be given to the peace-building 
capacity of religion at the diplomatic level.40 Additionally, a new 
journal, Faith and International Affairs, encourages interfaith 
dialogue, provides resources for those wanting “to build bridges of 
understanding within faith and international affairs,” and a forum for 
analysis and opinion that “sharpens both spiritual and political 
discernment.”41 In a recent article in this journal, for example, one 
 35. RUSSELL T. MCCUTCHEON, CRITICS NOT CARETAKERS: REDESCRIBING THE 
PUBLIC STUDY OF RELIGION 131 (2001). 
 36. KENNETH R. CRAYCRAFT, JR., THE AMERICAN MYTH OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
156–57 (1999). 
 37. APPLEBY, supra note 24; JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY, LEARNING LESSONS FROM 
WACO: WHEN THE PARTIES BRING THEIR GODS TO THE NEGOTIATION TABLE (2001); FROM 
THE GROUND UP: MENNONITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING 
(Cynthia Sampson & John Paul Lederach eds., 2000); MARC GOPIN, BETWEEN EDEN AND 
ARMAGEDDON: THE FUTURE OF WORLD RELIGIONS, VIOLENCE, AND PEACEMAKING (2000); 
see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD (2002); MARK 
JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS 
VIOLENCE (3d ed., rev. & updated 2003).  
 38. FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY: TRUMPING REALPOLITIK, supra note 1. 
 39. Id. at 3. 
 40. Id. at 5–6. 
 41. Seiple, supra note 2, at 1. 
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can read about the rituals of prayer and fasting that led to a 
breakthrough in difficult peace negotiations in the Kashmir region.42
Along with practical analysis in journals and books, new 
organizations are sprouting up to encourage a place for religion in 
diplomacy. For instance, the International Center for Religion and 
Diplomacy in Washington, D.C., works “[t]o address identity-based 
conflicts that exceed the reach of traditional diplomacy by 
incorporating religion as part of the solution.”43
The Center’s mission statement says: 
Regardless of one’s spiritual persuasion, there are two compelling 
reasons why the Center’s work is important: (1) the need for more 
effective preventive measures to minimize the occasions in which 
we have to send our sons and daughters in harm’s way and (2) the 
need for a stable global environment to support continued 
economic growth that can benefit an expanding percentage of the 
world’s population. 
By linking religious reconciliation with official diplomacy, the 
ICRD is creating a new synergy for peacemaking that serves both 
of these needs. It also provides a more fruitful approach for dealing 
with ethnic conflict, tribal warfare, and religious hostilities.44
Other organizations with a specific focus on peacebuilding 
through religious understanding include the program on Religion 
and Conflict Resolution at the Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious 
Understanding,45 PeaceMakers International,46 and the Program in 
Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding at the Joan B. Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, 47 
which seeks to strengthen the potential for peacebuilding within 
 42. Brian Cox & Daniel Philpott, Faith-Based Diplomacy: An Ancient Idea Newly 
Emergent, BRANDYWINE REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF., Fall 2003, at 31. 
 43. The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, http://www.icrd.org (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2005). 
 44. The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, Mission, 
http://www.icrd.org/about.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  
 45. Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, http://www.tanenbaum.org 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2004). 
 46. PeaceMakers International, Inc., http://www.peacemakers.net (last visited Mar. 6, 
2004). 
 47. The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Program in Religion, 
Conflict and Peacebuilding, http://kroc.nd.edu/research/religion.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2004). 
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religious traditions in addition to exploring the complex roles of 
religion in contemporary conflicts.48
While the burgeoning of organizations that treat seriously the 
religious dimensions of domestic and foreign policy clearly indicates 
a trend, there is no obvious consensus at this early stage regarding 
the merits or outcomes of this trend. 
III. RELIGION IN U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 
The increased presence of religious belief and practice in the 
public arena is due in part to the evolution of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, as well 
as the growing intervention of religious communities in contested 
social policy debates. What remains unclear is exactly what role 
religion should take in policymaking and how these new 
manifestations of religious activism may contravene First 
Amendment doctrine. 
John Witte, legal scholar and director of the Interdisciplinary 
Study of Religion at Emory Law School, sees the shift to more 
public religion in the United States as both inevitable and necessary. 
He notes that over the last fifteen years the U.S. Supreme Court has 
abandoned much of its earlier separationism.49 The metaphorical 
“wall of separation between church and state,” envisaged by 
Jefferson,50 no longer looms large in the Court’s opinions, and 
privatization of religion is no longer the bargain that must be struck 
in order to attain religious freedom.51 According to Witte, there are 
two principles that emanate from the recent cases. First, public 
manifestations of religion must be as free as private religious practice 
 48. See also U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Interreligious Dialogue, 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.phpURL_ID=11680&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&UR
L_SECTION=201.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).  
 49. John Witte, Jr., The New Freedom of Public Religion, Editorial Opinion, Center for 
the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion, Emory University, http://www.law.emory.edu/ 
cisr/pressreleases/Editorialjohnwitte.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). On the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of religion, see WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS 
EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1994).  
  50. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut 
(Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.usconstitution.net/jeffwall.html. 
 51. On the growing tendency of the Supreme Court to favor equal treatment of religion 
with other forms of expression and activity, see Derek H. Davis, A Commentary on the Supreme 
Court’s “Equal Treatment” Doctrine as the New Constitutional Paradigm for Protecting 
Religious Liberty, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 717, 717–38 (2004). 
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because religious groups, in his words, “provide leaven and leverage 
for the polity to improve.”52 Second, the freedom of public religion 
sometimes requires the support of the state because it is impossible 
for religious bodies to avoid contact with today’s modern welfare 
state and all its ramifications in the educational, welfare, legal, social, 
and health care sectors.53
Such developments, in part, explain the rise of what Dennis 
Hoover calls “an activist center in American public life.”54 The new 
mobilization of predominantly conservative Christians exemplifies 
this resurgence of an active, religious public sphere. The activism of 
conservative Christians has manifested itself in two principal ways: 
first, they have called on certain politicians and writers for religion to 
assume a more prominent role in public life; and second, they have 
advocated the “charitable choice” provision of the welfare reform 
law, whereby government support is provided for faith-based 
organizations to address social problems.55 In addition, conservative 
Christians played a major role in persuading the U.S. government to 
make religious freedom a central aspect of its foreign policy with the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.56 As a result of this 
law, there is now an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 
Freedom, an office in the State Department, an Advisory 
Commission, and an annual report on the state of religious freedom 
worldwide.57 In addition, the President is required to resort to a 
range of disciplinary actions against countries that are major violators 
of religious freedom.58
 52. Witte, supra note 49. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Dennis R. Hoover, Charitable Choice and the New Religious Center, RELIGION IN 
THE NEWS, Spring 2000, available at http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol3No1/ 
charitable_choice_2000.htm; see also STEPHEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS (2004).  
 55. See Mark Silk, From the Editor: A Different Spiritual Politics, RELIGION IN THE 
NEWS, Summer 1999, available at http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol2No2/ 
spiritualpolitics.htm. 
 56. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 
(1998); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, International Religious Freedom, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2005); ALLEN HERTZKE, FREEING 
GOD’S CHILDREN: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE FOR GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2004). 
 57. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 56. 
 58. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AS A U.S. POLICY ISSUE (Rosalind I. J. Hackett et al. eds., 
2000); T. Jeremy Gunn, American Exceptionalism and Globalist Double Standards: A More 
Balanced Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 137, 137–52 (2002); T. Jeremy Gunn, A 
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Moreover, President George W. Bush has talked openly about 
the influence of his religious faith, particularly in the aftermath of 
September 11th.59 This has occasioned numerous articles in leading 
news magazines and newspapers regarding the President’s personal 
religious beliefs and practices.60 While statistics show that the 
majority of Americans like their leader to be God-fearing, they are 
not so keen about public professions of faith.61 Some journalists have 
criticized statements by politicians that there could be no morality 
without religion.62
Religion’s influence in U.S. politics is obvious in recent debates 
about school prayer, abortion, and homosexuality, as well as in the 
success of grassroots religious organizations in mobilizing voters.63 
Many liberal secularists decry this trend, rejecting any interaction 
between politics and religion. But in Why I Am Not a Secularist,64 
political theorist William E. Connolly argues that secularism needs 
refashioning to be more inclusive of the complex range of viewpoints 
now active in public life, including those predicated on religious 
belief.65 Through its narrow and intolerant understandings of public 
reason, secularism draws fire from its mainly Christian critics for not 
recognizing “the sources of morality most citizens endorse.”66  
Along similar lines, philosopher and ethicist Jeffrey Stout, in his 
latest book, Democracy and Tradition,67 makes a cogent case for 
greater inclusion of religious voices in a multicultural democratic 
Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. 2000 
BYU L. REV. 841; Eugenia Relaño Pastor, U.S. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998: A 
European Perspective, 2005 BYU L. REV. 711 (2005).  
 59. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Openly Religious, to a Point, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 
2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24634-
2004Sep15.html. 
 60. See, e.g., Jane Lampman, New Scrutiny of Role of Religion in Bush’s Policies, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 17, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0 
317/p01s01-uspo.html. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Stephen Carter et al., Roundtable on Religion in Politics, TIKKUN MAG., 
Nov.-Dec. 2000, 24. 
 63. This is well evidenced in the publication Religion in the News from the Leonard E. 
Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life, Trinity College, Hartford CT, 
available at http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RIN.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). 
 64. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, WHY I AM NOT A SECULARIST (1999). 
 65. Id. at 19. 
 66. Id. at 23. 
 67. See JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2004). 
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context. Indeed, he begins his book with an epigraph from John 
Dewey: “Democracy is a form of government only because it is a 
form of moral and spiritual association.”68 Seeking to negotiate a way 
beyond the current impasse between secular liberalism and the new 
traditionalism, Stout examines the roots of modern democracy. 
Drawing on American pragmatist philosophy, he argues that 
democracy’s achievements are predicated upon a vision of allowing a 
multitude of claims to be heard.69
For political philosopher Paul Weithman, any questions 
regarding the role religion may play in citizens’ decision making are 
essentially moral questions because a society’s commitment to liberal 
democracy necessarily entails certain moral and normative 
commitments for its citizens. Weithman has produced two well-
argued books on this subject, Religion and the Obligations of 
Citizenship, and an earlier, edited volume, Religion and 
Contemporary Liberalism.70 He identifies two main sets of questions 
that arise with regard to the proper role of religion in democratic 
politics. The first set asks how religion may affect political outcomes 
and how those outcomes square with the commitments of liberal 
democracy. In other words, he asks whether state support for a 
religion, all religions, or religious codes of conduct can be consistent 
with liberal democracy. 
In exploring this first set of questions, Weithman demonstrates 
how attention to political outcomes can illuminate what he calls the 
“puzzles” that arise in a liberal democracy.71 For example, in the 
much debated case of whether prayer should be permitted in public 
schools, he demonstrates that if prayer is permitted because the 
majority favors it, the liberty of the minority is compromised in the 
name of a democratic commitment to majoritarianism.72 But if 
prayer is not permitted, he explains, the liberal commitment to 
freedom of religion and the protection of minorities can thwart 
 68. Id. at vi. 
 69. Id. at 4–6. For a thoughtful review, see David Reidy, Speaking for the State, in 
SOUNDINGS (2005). See also the debate on this topic between two distinguished philosophers, 
ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE 
OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997). 
 70. PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (2002); 
RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM (Paul Weithman ed., 1997). 
 71. WEITHMAN, supra note 70; RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, supra 
note 70, at 2. 
 72. WEITHMAN, supra note 70, at 2. 
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measures the majority would like to enact. In another example, 
Weithman explores whether some citizens should be allowed to 
make ritual use of drugs that are generally proscribed. If so, he 
argues, the commitment to the equal treatment of all before the law 
can, under some circumstances, cede to religious liberty. If not, he 
states, it is rather that “religious liberty can be restricted in the name 
of treating all as equals before a law that the state has an interest in 
enforcing.”73 Such are the dilemmas of a liberal democracy. 
The second set of questions highlighted by Weithman pertains to 
religious political inputs. This line of inquiry concerns the use of 
religious arguments in the political sphere either as a basis for voting, 
for political preferences, or for policymaking. As he rightly notes, 
“[l]iberal democratic commitments to religious toleration and 
church-state separation are sometimes thought to be incompatible 
with citizens’ taking their religiously based political views as the basis 
of important political decisions.”74 He asks whether there is a 
difference between religious and political leaders and ordinary 
citizens, or between fora, in terms of the appropriateness of religious 
political inputs.75
Weithman’s contentions force citizens to think more critically 
and more deeply about the nature of citizenship. Because voting and 
advocacy are collective enterprises, they must be conducted 
responsibly and reasonably. He notes that citizens in liberal 
democracies, such as the United States, are deeply divided on the 
nature and demands of citizenship.76 Sometimes these disagreements 
stem from the political activities of religious organizations; in those 
societies where the political role of such organizations is more valued 
however, this is less of an issue. Weithman feels that religious 
organizations may be instrumental in facilitating people’s political 
participation and in developing their sense of citizenship; they may 
also generate debate regarding the conditions of participation and 
the goods that should be conferred by various levels of participation. 
Consequently, he argues that “citizens may offer exclusively religious 
arguments in public debate and that they may rely on religious 
reasons when they cast their votes.”77 Importantly, Weithman 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 3. 
 77. Id. 
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underscores the need to distinguish between those who violate the 
obligations of citizenship and those whose politics we dislike. In 
other words, restrictions on religious political argument are 
sometimes based on assumptions about what religious citizens stand 
for, when in reality there may be considerable diversity of opinion. 
Weithman employs empirical data and contextual differences to 
query presumptions and to assess what he calls the “reasonability of 
deep disagreement.”78
Thus, the current debate over the proper role of religion in the 
public sphere indicates a reexamination of the traditional conception 
of a proverbial wall between church and state. This debate indicates 
that religion should play a new, yet still undetermined, part in public 
policy. 
IV. MANAGEMENT OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE 
AND THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES 
A. Tension between Religion and Secularism 
While some writers have sought ways to popularize religion for 
the Western consumer or have tried to find cogent historical and 
theoretical arguments for a greater public role for religion, other 
observers approach these issues by addressing the tensions, and as 
will be shown, the misunderstandings, between secularism and 
religion. They see growing antagonism in modern democratic states 
between secularism, with its focus on individual rights, and the 
resurgence of religion, with its communitarian emphasis. As a case in 
point, the summer 2003 issue of the prestigious journal Daedalus: 
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences is devoted to 
the topic of secularism and religion.79 Several of the writers address 
the possibilities of religious pluralism and freedom in various national 
and regional contexts. Others, such as renowned religion analyst 
Martin Marty, search for new paradigms, such as “religio-secular 
world,” to represent these changing global dynamics.80
 78. Id. at 5; see also Mark Chaves et al., Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits’ 
Political Activities?, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 292 (2004). 
 79. DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Summer 2003.  
 80. Martin Marty, Our Religio-secular World, DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., 
Summer 2003, at 42, 42.  
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 One of the best scholarly approaches to the contested place of 
religion in the public sphere is anthropologist Talal Asad’s latest 
book, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity.81 In 
keeping with his understanding of modern anthropology, he 
explores the phenomenon of secularism across different time periods, 
cultures, and regions. By so doing, Asad shows how embedded 
concepts, such as religion and secularism, are supported or 
challenged by a variety of “sensibilities, attitudes, assumptions, and 
behaviors.”82 Asad contends that the modern idea of a secular society 
involves a “distinctive relation between state law and personal 
morality, such that religion became essentially a matter of private 
belief.”83 Translating the individual’s ability to freely express and 
practice his or her beliefs into a legal right brings religion back into 
the public domain.84
One of Asad’s most important conclusions is that a “secular state 
is not one characterized by religious indifference, or rational ethics—
or political toleration. It is a complex arrangement of legal reasoning, 
moral practice, and political authority. This arrangement is not the 
simple outcome of the struggle of secular reason against the 
despotism of religious authority.”85 To get beyond the notion that 
religion and secularism are competing ideologies, Asad avers that it 
behooves us to look at “what people do with and to ideas and 
practices,”86 and why meanings and concepts change. He also argues 
that religion has always been a factor in the world of power, and that 
“the categories of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ turn out to implicate each 
other more profoundly than we thought.”87 In other words, modern 
 81. ASAD, supra note 5. For a review, see Robert W. Hefner, Rethinking Religion and 
the Modern, H-NET REVIEWS, H-GENDER-MIDEAST, Mar. 2004, http://www.h-net.org/ 
reviews/showrev.cgi?path=89361083559676 (reviewing ASAD, supra note 5). 
 82. ASAD, supra note 5, at 17. 
 83. Id. at 205. 
 84. Id. These ideas developed in Western Europe in tandem with the formation of the 
modern state. In the final chapter of the book, “Reconfigurations of Law and Ethics in 
Colonial Egypt,” Asad probingly examines how the secular was thought about and absorbed in 
Egyptian culture prior to its ascendance to a modern state. He finds that the reconfigurations 
of law, religion, and ethics in colonial Egypt created new social spaces in which secularism 
could grow. Id. at 208. 
 85. Id. at 255. 
 86. Id. at 194. 
 87. Id. at 200. 
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state power is highly pervasive, and it seeks to regulate all aspects of 
individual and social life, including religion.88
Similarly nuanced analysis of the concept of the secular is 
provided by historian Nikki Keddie, who emphasizes the fact that the 
word secular has had a far greater variety of meanings than current 
usage may suggest.89 For centuries in Europe, it referred to the 
change in clerical status whereby a monk became a secular priest.90 It 
was only in the nineteenth century that secularism became known as 
the independent doctrine that religious institutions and values 
should play no role in the affairs of the state.91
Keddie compares the rise and fall of secular and religious politics 
in various parts of the world and notes the contextual factors that 
influence these trends.92 For example, Muslim countries have 
negative views of secularism because they associate it with autocratic 
rule and western influence.93 This is well evidenced in the case of 
Nigeria, where Nigerian Muslims commonly critique the purported 
neutrality of the secular state as a western Christian conspiracy to 
undermine Islam.94 By comparison, Islam as a force for mobilization 
still seems relatively untainted. Yet somewhat paradoxically, Keddie 
notes, the Islamic country where anti-clerical feelings run highest 
and secularist reforms have been successful is present-day Iran.95
Keddie contends that constant battles in South Asia—namely in 
India and Sri Lanka—between religious nationalism and secular 
movements serve to weaken support for secularism in the region.96 
So too does the imposition of secularist ideas from the top down, 
 88. Id. at 199. 
 89. Nikki R. Keddie, Secularism and Its Discontents, DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & 
SCI., Summer 2003, at 14, 14.  
 90. Id. at 15. 
 91. Id. at 15–16. 
 92. Id. at 18. 
 93. Id. at 25. 
 94. See David Westerlund, Secularism, Civil Religion or Islam: Islamic Revivalism and 
the National Question in Nigeria, in RELIGION, STATE AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY 
AFRICA: NIGERIA, SUDAN, SOUTH AFRICA, ZAIRE, AND MOZAMBIQUE (Austin Metumara 
Ahanotu ed., 1992).  
 95. Keddie, supra note 89, at 25. 
 96. Id. at 28; see also RICHARD FRANCIS GOMBRICH & GANANATH OBEYESEKERE, 
BUDDHISM TRANSFORMED: RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN SRI LANKA (1988); MARK 
JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR?: RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE 
SECULAR STATE (1993); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, BUDDHISM BETRAYED?: RELIGION, 
POLITICS, AND VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA (1992). 
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without ensuring support for them at the popular level or from 
religious leaders.97 Since Western political hegemony is less of an 
issue in India than it is in the Muslim world, there are many Indian 
intellectuals who defend secularism even if they may criticize its 
application.98 In fact, Keddie states that contemporary India has 
probably produced the largest body of writing in the modern world 
debating the merits of secularism.99 With the controversial efforts of 
the previous Indian government (the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP) 
to promote Hindu nationalism to the detriment of religious 
minorities,100 a number of recent publications advocate the need to 
move beyond current understandings of secularism in order to 
effectively protect minority interests.101
The writings of scholars like Asad and Keddie teach that there is 
a need to put the concepts of secularism and religion in their 
appropriate historical and cultural contexts. Seen in context, these 
concepts are not always as unequivocal or as polarized as is 
commonly assumed.102 Furthermore, secularization has been in 
progress around the world for far longer, and its success has been far 
more partial, than is often known. This comparative and historical 
knowledge could help mitigate some of the current tensions and 
misunderstandings over secularism, notably in states such as 
Nigeria.103
 97. Keddie, supra note 89, at 28. 
 98. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN KIM, IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY: DEBATES ON RELIGIOUS 
CONVERSION IN INDIA (2003); MODERN MYTHS, LOCKED MINDS: SECULARISM AND 
FUNDAMENTALISM IN INDIA (T.N. Madan ed., 1997); SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS (Rajeev 
Bhargava ed., 1998). 
 99. Keddie, supra note 89, at 28. 
 100. See MADHU KISHWAR, RELIGION AT THE SERVICE OF NATIONALISM AND OTHER 
ESSAYS (1998); A.G. NOORANI, THE RSS AND THE BJP: A DIVISION OF LABOR (2000). 
 101. E.g., NEERA CHANDHOKE, BEYOND SECULARISM: THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS 
MINORITIES (1999); JAMES MASSEY, MINORITIES AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN A 
DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 102. See, e.g., Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, The Synergy and Interdependence of Human Rights, 
Religion and Secularism, 3 POLYLOG: F. INTERCULTURAL PHIL. 13 (2001), available at 
http://them.polylog.org/3/faa-en.htm; Consciousness of Vulnerability, in A HUMAN RIGHTS 
MESSAGE 16–19 (Gov’t of Sweden ed., 1998). 
 103. See SIMEON O. ILESANMI, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE NIGERIAN STATE 
(1997); Simeon O. Ilesanmi, The Myth of a Secular State: A Study of Religious Politics with 
Historical Illustrations, 6 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM REL. 105–17 (1995). 
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B. Religious Pluralism 
Accompanying the increased role of religion in the public sphere 
is the challenge and opportunity of religious diversity. In some parts 
of the world, such as Latin America, the concern is less about 
secularization and the marginalization of religion and more about 
the rise of new religious groups competing for power, recognition, 
and resources. Disestablishing state religions and dismantling the 
complicities between dominant religions and state power have 
changed the stakes of coexistence between religious communities. 
Against the backdrop of the forces of democratization, 
mediatization, and the global market, religious groups are compelled 
to justify their existence to the state and consumers alike. These 
processes are clearly visible in many Latin American countries, where 
the powerful Roman Catholic Church now has to compete in the 
marketplace along with burgeoning evangelical groups and 
indigenous revival movements. 
Political scientist Dan Levine, who has been conducting research 
on religion and politics in this region for many years, observes: 
Latin America is now approaching a state of pluralism (among 
Christian groups) for the first time in its history. This religious 
pluralism entails not only a multiplicity of voices speaking ‘in the 
name of religion’ but also a conflict for voice within specific 
groups. The spread of literacy and the access to mass media have 
diffused the tools of religious expertise into many hands.104
Local and international scholars are working to interpret this new 
plurality of religious identities and formations. Levine offers a 
positive reading of the politicization of religion in Latin America: 
A story that not long ago could be told with confidence about how 
Catholicism supported and reflected the established order became a 
story in which religion (Protestant as well as Catholic) has become 
a source of new ideas about how to organize society and politics, 
and how to lead the good life. It is no exaggeration to say that 
many of the region’s most significant movements for change would 
 104. Levine, supra note 3, at 135. The three presidential candidates in the December 
2003 elections in Guatemala reflected this plurality: one was a Catholic, another was an 
evangelical Protestant, and the third was a priest of the Mayan indigenous religion. 
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have been unthinkable without religious participation and 
legitimation.105
Levine also points out that the pluralization of religious voices, 
leading to greater religious activism and public presence, has 
immediate consequences for democracy.106 He states that “in a plural 
environment, it is to everyone’s interest to maintain open civil 
society with guarantees of free speech and equal access to institutions 
and to public spaces.”107 This is especially important as these societies 
leave behind the dictatorships and religious monopolies which 
characterized the Latin American scene up until the late 1980s. 
Levine points to the emergence of discourses on the human and civil 
rights of the person, which have been helpful in modernizing the 
state. 108
Efforts to accommodate religious and cultural diversity in 
transitional states and new democratic dispensations are naturally 
subject to extensive scrutiny. South African law withstands this 
scrutiny because of its explicit recognition of religious and cultural 
minorities and celebration of the country’s diverse heritage after 
decades of neo-colonial repression. South Africa has implemented 
these changes primarily through its constitution,109 religious 
broadcasting,110 and religious education.111 The new government 
 105. Id. at 123–24. 
 106. Id. at 135. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 136. 
 109. Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Perspectives of Church-State Relations in 
South Africa, 1999 BYU L. REV. 635–72 (1999). 
 110. Rosalind I. J. Hackett, Mediated Religion in South Africa: Balancing Air-time and 
Rights Claims, in MEDIA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Birgit Meyer & Annelies 
Moors eds., 2005). 
 111. See RELIGION AND POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA (Abdulkader Tayob & Wolfram 
Weisse eds., 1998); RELIGION AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY, (J. W. de 
Gruchy & S. Martin eds., 1995); RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: OPTIONS FOR A NEW 
SOUTH AFRICA (David Chidester et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994); H. Christina Steyn, The Role of 
Multi-religious Education in the Transformation of South African Society, in RELIGION AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 131–42 (Thomas G. Walsh & Frank 
Kaufmann eds., 1999). Similarly, Professor Abdelfattah Amor, the former Special Rapporteur 
of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Religion and Belief of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights, has launched meetings and publications since 1995—several organized by 
the Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion and Belief—to explore the role of school education 
in relation to religious tolerance and intolerance. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Interim Report Prepared by Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights on Freedom of Religion or Belief, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 
5HACKETT.FIN 9/13/2005 3:41 PM 
659] The Role of Religion in Changing Public Spheres 
 679 
 
has, for the most part, resisted efforts to continue to privilege South 
Africa’s Christian majority (over seventy percent of South Africans 
are Christians according to the most recent census).112 Many of the 
religious leaders who fought for liberation from the brutal apartheid 
regime have become officials of the new government. 
Interestingly, many European countries seem regressive in terms 
of honoring the rights of minority religious groups in their 
territories. Alarmed at the growth of immigrant populations, 
particularly Muslims (there are now an estimated four to five million 
Muslims in France, for example),113 some European governments 
have taken draconian measures to curb the activities of non-
conventional and unpopular religious groups.114 Sects are feared for 
their purported negative psychological effects and undue American 
influence.115 The wearing of the Muslim veil in the workplace and 
schools has been fiercely contested in France and Germany.116 French 
President Jacques Chirac contends that the veil or scarf is a sign of 
“aggressive proselytism” and has introduced controversial new 
legislation banning the wearing of religious symbols in public 
schools.117 In eastern Europe, Russia, and central Asia more 
119(b), U.N. Doc. A/58/296 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/DFDC01ED0062E4C8C1256DB1004EB2C8/$File/N0347258
.doc?OpenElement; see also TEACHING FOR TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR 
BELIEF (Lena Larsen & Ingvild T. Plesner eds., 2002); The Oslo Coalition on Freedom of 
Religion and Belief, Teaching for Tolerance for Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
http://www.oslocoalition.org/html/project_school_education/index.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2005). 
 112. ZAR.co.za, Statistics, http://zar.co.za/stats.htm (last visited on March 25, 2005). 
This is a promotional website providing general statistics and information about South Africa. 
 113. Katherine Pratt Ewing, Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the 
Relationship Between Church and State in Germany and France, in ENGAGING CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 63–80 
(Richard Shweder et al. eds., 2002); see also An-Na’im, supra note 102. 
 114. See, e.g., REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE, supra 
note 6; Symposium, Freedom of Religion or Belief in the OSCE Region: Challenges to Law and 
Practice, Concluding Seminar Statement by the Moderator (June 28, 2001) available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2001/06/1523_en.pdf. 
 115. Thomas Robbins, Combating “Cults” and “Brainwashing” in the United States and 
Western Europe: A Comment on Richardson and Introvigne’s Report, 40 J. SCI. STUDY 
RELIGION 73 (2001).  
 116. Mastafa Malik, A Woman’s Head Scarf, a Continent’s Discomfort, WASH. POST, Mar. 
13, 2005, at B02.  
 117. BBC News, France Awaits Headscarves Report, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
world/europe/3307995.stm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). For a comparative analysis, see T. 
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generally, there are similar patterns of cultural preservation and 
animosity toward competing religious options.118
The rise of religion among immigrant and diasporic communities 
and in the public debates about multiculturalism has given culture, 
particularly cultural practice, a new prominence in regional, national, 
and international politics. Frequently the disputes over symbols, 
resources, recognition, and access are resolved in the legal sphere.119
This ongoing controversy over religious identity is manifest in 
the possible inclusion of references to God or Europe’s Christian 
heritage in the new constitution of the European Union.120 Another 
pertinent example is the battle in international politics over family 
values.121 Similarly, women often find themselves at the center of 
conflicts over the public expression of identity, as Martha Nussbaum 
has cogently demonstrated in her writings.122 As these examples 
illustrate, religious symbols can become flashpoints for the problems 
of religious pluralism. 
Bill Moyers, a respected and popular commentator, asks what 
possibilities exist for new and more equitable conversations about 
Jeremy Gunn, Under God But Not the Scarf: The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in the 
United States and Laïcité in France, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 7 (2004). 
 118. Human Rights Without Frontiers International contends that the overt or covert 
denial of the rights of religious minorities should be part of the test for admission to the 
European Union. See generally Human Rights Without Frontiers Int’l, http://www.hrwf.net 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2005); see also Igor Rotar, Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Pressure Achieves Falun 
Gong Deregulation, FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 22, 2005, http://www.forum18.org/ 
Archive.php?article_id=529. 
 119. See BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM (2001); BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY (2002); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005). See generally Rosalind I.J. Hackett & 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Law and Human Rights, CULTURE & RELIGION (forthcoming 
March 2005).  
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religious difference and conceptions of the good life.123 Moyers 
wants to learn from difference but not be alienated by it nor expect it 
to be glossed over by liberal common denominators.124 Similarly, a 
team of renowned North American legal and cultural experts has 
recently published their extensive deliberations on how to balance 
communitarian demands (of which religious identity is a dimension) 
with the standards of modern liberal democracies.125 Others rightly 
point to the challenges of moving from a “rampant diversity to a 
culture of pluralism,”126 and balancing the alternatives of 
homogeneity and heterogeneity.127
Negotiating multiculturalism has ceased to be a trivial issue, 
particularly when now associated with security questions.128 It is 
further compounded by what Talal Asad terms the collision of 
“overlapping patterns of territory, authority, and time . . . with the 
idea of the imagined national community”—in other words, the 
difficulty of allowing “multiple ways of life” to flourish in ever-
complex space and time.129 Harmonious pluralism will require 
rethinking on a number of levels and an honest dialogue among all 
parties involved in each particular context, informed by 
constitutional and international human rights standards as well as a 
judicious sense of history. Academics should not be forgotten in 
these processes, as there is good evidence that their intervention in 
France and Germany, for example, has served to lessen the moral 
panic over so-called sects and cults.130
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The eruption of religion into changing political landscapes the 
world over indicates two important findings. First, the management 
of religious and cultural difference and the treatment of minorities 
have emerged as key elements of successful governance. Second, 
these issues necessitate public debate and dialogue, with educational 
and media sites emerging as significant popular locations for this 
purpose, supplementing initiatives by political and religious leaders. 
It is heartening to learn that the awareness of heightened risks of 
religious conflict, or the threats to peace posed by extremist religious 
groups, has engendered an upsurge in inter-religious dialogue in 
many parts of the world. However, we must be vigilant concerning 
the forces of deregulation and liberalization that inevitably 
accompany democratization and globalization. While the new 
opportunities afforded religious individuals and communities to 
represent themselves and to participate in the public sphere are 
undeniable, and indeed long overdue in many instances, they can 
equally lead to new forms of separatism and demonization of 
religious others.131 The development of civil society values of 
tolerance, cooperation, and civility can easily be subordinated to the 
logic of the market or to the pressures of religious and political 
fundamentalism.132 It therefore behooves us to play our humble 
parts, whether as religious or political leaders, educators, lawyers, or 
media professionals, human rights activists or ordinary laypersons, 
liberals or conservatives, in ensuring that the call for more public 
expressions of religion is met in the most equitable way possible. 
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